Australia’s need for a Resilient PNT CRC

By on 14 January, 2025
A group of men and woman standing together, being the people involved in proposing a resilient PNT system for Australia.
The geospatial/PNT experts involved in the kick-off meeting for the SHIELD PNT CRC proposal: Safoora Zaminpardaz (RMIT), Amir Khodabandeh (UMelb), Suelynn Choy (RMIT), Ryan Keenan (Positioning Insights), Jeff Kasparian (KasComm), Graeme Kernich (FrontierSI), Allison Kealy (Swinburne), Andrew Dempster (UNSW) and Eldar Rubinov (FrontierSI).

Leading geospatial experts say the time is right for Australia to develop and strengthen its PNT capabilities.

By Jonathan Nally

Positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) vulnerabilities have been the most critical challenge facing many geospatial professionals for some time now. With our modern world daily becoming more reliant on PNT for the provision of essential services, the need for ensured, reliable and resilient PNT is growing ever stronger.

Yet both the global and domestic PNT ecosystem is facing increasing strains and threats, from denial of service (as any pilot flying in certain parts of the Middle East and Eastern Europe will tell you), to the sovereign risk of relying on foreign-owned PNT assets, to a lack of suitably qualified individuals in geodesy, which is the backbone of PNT.

PNT is especially vital for the operation of many of Australia’s critical infrastructure sectors, such as telecommunications, defence, health and many others. According to the federal government’s Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre, “… a substantive loss of or loss of access to, or deliberate or accidental manipulation of, PNT services that would affect the functioning of a critical infrastructure asset, is a material risk.”

That’s why a group of leading Australian geospatial professionals are now pushing for the establishment of an Australian Co-operative Research Centre for PNT, which would be known as the Secure, Hardened, Integrity-Enhanced, Location and Timing Defence (SHIELD) PNT CRC.

To find out more about the proposed CRC and what it would do, we spoke with Professors Allison Kealy, the inaugural Director of Swinburne University’s Innovative Planet Research Institute, and Professor Andrew Dempster, Director of the Australian Centre for Space Engineering Research (ACSER) at UNSW, both leading figures in Australian geodesy/PNT research.

Where did the idea come from for an Australian PNT CRC?

The idea for an Australian PNT CRC arose from our involvement in, and recognition of, the significant international efforts focused on addressing the risks to critical infrastructure and national security due to their heavy reliance on trusted PNT services.

Similarly in Australia, PNT services, provided by satellite-based systems such as the GNSS, have become as essential and relied upon as other utilities. Just like electricity or telecommunications, they are assumed to be consistently available and trusted, for critical functions across a wide range of sectors, including the electrical power grid, communication networks, mobile devices, transportation systems, banking, precision agriculture, weather forecasting, and emergency response. This reliance has not been matched by a corresponding urgency or strategic effort to protect and secure our core PNT services.

Why is PNT so important?

The need for a resilient, secure, and independent PNT capability is now critical. In the UK, it has been estimated that a 24-hour GNSS outage could result in a £1.4 billion loss to the economy, with a seven-day outage costing £7.6 billion. The majority of these losses would come from impacts on emergency services, road transport and maritime transport, representing 87.5% of the total economic losses.

To address this, the UK Government has developed a Government Policy Framework for Greater PNT Resilience, including a ten-point plan that establishes a National PNT Office and a National Timing Centre, along with back-up plans for GNSS disruptions, terrestrial timing networks, and precision clock research to boost resilience and reduce risk.

Similarly, in the USA, Executive Order 13905, Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services, was issued in February 2020 and aimed at ensuring that critical infrastructure sectors such as energy, finance, and transportation are resilient to disruptions in GPS or other sources of PNT.

A futuristic map of Australia with a glowing coastal outline and glowing lines crisscrossing the country, to represent a resilient PNT network.
©stock.adobe.com/au/immimagery

Australia, however, lacks a comparable strategy or a dedicated plan to address these vulnerabilities, which is concerning given the growing number and complexity of threats. While many sectors are increasingly aware of the risks posed to PNT services, there remains a need for greater coordination and preparedness to manage potential disruptions and cascading impacts.

A dedicated entity is essential to assess risks, drive innovative solutions, and strengthen industry collaboration to ensure Australia can detect and mitigate vulnerabilities in the PNT services that underpin critical infrastructure. The SHIELD PNT CRC is being designed to meet these needs.

What would such a CRC do?

An Australian PNT CRC would bring together academia, industry and government stakeholders to develop and implement solutions that deliver a trusted PNT utility that enhances critical infrastructure resilience. In principle, we are focused on delivering PNT solutions that are not only fit for purpose but also aligned with the specific risk profiles of each sector. These solutions will be designed to either maintain optimal performance under threat, degrade gracefully to minimise disruption, or recover within a predefined, rapid timeframe.

By leveraging cutting-edge technologies and innovative frameworks, the CRC would ensure that PNT services are highly resilient, enabling critical infrastructure and national security operations to continue seamlessly even in the face of complex and evolving challenges.

In short, an Australian PNT CRC would be the cornerstone of a national effort to secure PNT services, enabling the country to withstand and respond to disruptions, ensuring the continuous operation of essential services, and safeguarding Australia’s national interests.

How do you define ‘resilient’ PNT?

Resilient PNT refers to the ability of PNT systems to provide ‘trusted’ information, even during disruptions, interference or attacks. It ensures that the systems supporting critical infrastructure and national security can continue to function effectively under adverse conditions. The concept of ‘trusted’ can be expanded to include graceful degradation of services, timely warnings of failures and/or automatically switching to alternative or multiple technologies as required. Key aspects include:

  • Redundancy: Incorporating multiple, diverse sources of PNT data (such as satellite, terrestrial and inertial systems) to ensure that if one source fails or is compromised, others can take over without a significant loss of service.
  • Adaptability: The ability of PNT systems to dynamically adjust to different levels of threat or degradation, maintaining a certain level of accuracy and performance even when under attack or in environments that degrade satellite signals (such as urban canyons or dense forests).
  • Cybersecurity: Protecting PNT systems from intentional interference, such as jamming, spoofing or hacking, which could compromise the accuracy and reliability of the service.
  • Graceful degradation: In cases where full functionality cannot be maintained, resilient PNT systems are designed to degrade in a controlled manner, ensuring that services are not completely lost, but instead reduce precision or functionality temporarily.
  • Rapid recovery: The ability to quickly restore full PNT functionality after a disruption, ensuring that any loss in service is minimal and temporary.
  • System monitoring and response: Continuous monitoring for potential disruptions and having systems in place to quickly detect, diagnose, and respond to any threats or failures in PNT services.

Are there any other important considerations?

One critical point I’d like to highlight is that the domain of PNT extends well beyond the concepts of sensors and generating coordinates and timing information. Underpinning PNT is the global geodetic supply chain that produces the geodetic products at the foundation of these coordinates and timing information. Strengthening this supply chain through workforce planning, securing the global geodetic infrastructure and understanding the relationship between geodesy and PNT is often ignored in discussions about PNT from non-PNT sectors. With significant impacts on gravity, location determination and reference frames, identifying threats around resilience cannot be decoupled from a conversation about geodesy.

How does Australian PNT compare to other countries?

Australia has made significant strides in PNT, particularly with the development of capabilities such as the Southern Positioning Augmentation Network (SouthPAN) and investments in satellite-based augmentation systems. However, compared to other advanced countries such as the US, Europe and Japan, we are still developing our resilience in PNT capabilities. These regions have assessed the economic impact of loss of PNT to their economies and put in place resilience frameworks that make their PNT assets much more robust. They heavily invested in alternative PNT technologies.

The SHIELD CRC would give Australia the opportunity to catch up to the state of the art for the Australian context, develop sovereign capabilities and advantages, and lead in areas specific to our needs, such as remote and maritime PNT solutions.

What sort of response have you had so far?

The response has been overwhelmingly positive. Key stakeholders from the Australian geospatial/PNT sector, defence and companies involved in critical infrastructure sectors have expressed strong interest. We’ve already engaged with several leading universities, industry leaders and government bodies who recognise the importance of resilient PNT systems. Moving forward, we aim to expand our network and bring in partners from diverse sectors like telecommunications, transportation, energy, emergency services, and cybersecurity to ensure a wide-reaching impact.

What’s the next step?

The next step is to solidify partnerships and define the research priorities for the CRC proposal. This involves building a strong consortium of collaborators and engaging with key government agencies to demonstrate the critical need for this initiative. The formal CRC bidding process involves submitting a detailed proposal to the Australian Government’s CRC Program, which outlines the scope, impact and potential outcomes of the research. This will be followed by an evaluation process where proposals are assessed based on their alignment with national priorities and the potential for economic and societal benefits.

How can people become involved?

People who are interested in learning more about the Australian PNT CRC or becoming involved can reach out directly via email (akealy@swin.edu.au). We encourage interested parties from academia, industry and government to connect with us, as we are actively looking to expand our consortium and welcome diverse perspectives.

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